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Abstract: Voluminous studies have examined the relationship between foreign ownership and firm productivity. 
Two general patterns emerge at the empirical level: they are essentially correlational and results are mixed. This 
paper estimates the causal effect of foreign presence on a variety of productivity measures. We rely on a selection 
on observables approach based on the idea that all variables that influence foreign ownership status and firm 
productivity are fully captured by the available control variables, eliminating the problem of selection bias. Using 
firm-level data from three ASEAN countries, the study finds that productivity of foreign-owned firms is 
consistently above that of domestically-owned firms regardless of different productivity measures and types of 
matching algorithms. This result suggests to a large extent the benefits of foreign participation in the economy. 
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Introduction 
 
The flow of foreign direct investment (FDI), 
especially to developing countries, has grown in 
importance in the last three decades. The theoretical 
literature, however, has highlighted a number of 
channels through which foreign investment inflows 
will be beneficial to the recipient country. One strand 
of the literature focuses on the FDI-growth nexus. 
The model predicts a robust positive correlation 
between FDI and the host country's growth. It 
appears that foreign investments will not only 
increase capital accumulation but also generate 
positive externalities and improve the host's country 
technology which in turn leads to higher rates of 
aggregate productivity and economic growth. A large 
number of empirical studies seem to support this 
endogenous growth hypothesis (Alfaro et al. [1]; 
Barrell and Pain [2]; Borensztein et al. [3]; Cippolina 
et al. [4]; de Mello [5]; Durham [6]). 
 
Apart from macro-economic perspectives, a vast 
empirical literature which uses a single- developing 
country study has been devoted to explore the micro-
economic effects of foreign ownership. They typically 
give considerable attention to the differences 
between domestically and foreign-owned firms in 
terms of productivity gaps and spillover effects. The 
general results indicate that the impacts of FDI are 
not uniform across firms. They certainly depend on 
industry or/and firm characteristics and types of 
foreign investments (Blomström and Sjöholm [7]; 
Jordaan [8]; Kugler [9]; Waldkirch and Ofosu [10]). 
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Another notable aspect is that the existing empirical 
evidence does not sufficiently address the endo-
geneity of FDI (e.g. foreign investments may flow 
into more productive industries or firms) and 
omitted variables (e.g. the presence of particular 
shocks that directly influences firm productivity). 
Thus, such studies are unable to convincingly 
establish a causal relationship between FDI inflows 
and outcomes of interest. 
 
To fill the abovementioned gaps, recent studies 
follow the literature on micro-econometric evaluation 
to offer new insights into the causal effects of foreign 
investments on firm performance (Alfaro and Chen 
[11]; Arnold and Javorcik [12]; Girma and Görg [13]; 
Girma et al. [14]; Xu and Sheng [15]). Despite the 
methodological merits of the papers, the empirical 
evidence is still conclusive. There also remains a 
question whether the findings from these studies can 
be extrapolated under different contexts. 
 
This paper uses a micro-econometric approach to 
provide additional investigation of the importance of 
foreign ownership on firm productivity. The setting 
is manufacturing firms in Indonesia, the Philippines, 
and Vietnam. The three ASEAN countries are of 
interest for at least two important reasons. First, 
along with Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia, these 
countries have become major recipients of FDI 
inflows to ASEAN. They made up more than 95% of 
FDI inflows to the ASEAN region during 2004-2007 
(Uttama and Peridy [16]). Second, as developing 
countries, the three countries under study have 
experienced a relatively technological backwardness 
compared with advanced industrialized countries, 
and thus there will be stronger effects of 
technological growth in the former region as a result 
of foreign investments (Findlay [17]). 
Inggrid / Does the Rabbit's Foot Actually Work? / JTI, Vol. 17, No. 1, June 2015, pp. 27–34 
 28 
Given that the available dataset is essentially cross-
sectional; our strategy is to control for observables 
differences between the foreign and domestic firms 
by employing matching algorithms. These methods 
allow us to create a missing counterfactual of each 
foreign-owned firm. In the exercise, we pair up each 
foreign firm with a domestic firm that has similar 
observable characteristics and operates in the same 
country and year. Similarities are identified from 
firm-level attributes that are able to predict the 
foreign ownership status of a firm. Finally, the 
causal effect of foreign ownership is measured by the 
average difference in productivity between foreign-
owned firms and their domestic matches.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
The next section provides a detailed description of 
the dataset and an overview of the empirical 
strategy. It is followed by the description of the used 
variable in the main analysis and the discussion of 
the main findings. The final section concludes 
 
Methods 
 
Data  
 
Our dataset comes from the Enterprise Survey 
conducted by the World Bank. The main objectives of 
the survey are to provide comprehensive business 
environment indicators and identify major obstacles 
to private sector development and employment 
creation. The survey collects detailed information on 
firm characteristics, including ownership structures, 
dimensions of external business environment (i.e. 
suppliers, competitors, consumers, infrastructure, 
crime, and government relations), a wide range of 
issues in the internal business environment (i.e. 
physical resources and capabilities, such as land 
ownership, quality of human resources, labor unions, 
and firm capacity), and firm performance.  The main 
advantage of the survey is the use of a standardized 
questionnaire to collect the data which facilitates 
researchers to conduct a comparable cross-country 
study. Registered firms are selected through a 
stratified random sampling procedure. They are 
stratifies based on size, industrial sector (manufac-
turing and services sectors in particular), and 
geographical location within a country, afterward 
firms are randomly sampled within these strata.  
 
We restrict our sample to only manufacturing firms 
in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam in 2009 
because the used dataset is richer for this business 
sector. After the data cleaning process, it yields 493 
observations (32.50%) for Indonesia, 562 obser-
vations (37.05%) for the Philippines, and 462 
observations (30.45%) for Vietnam, leaving us with a 
total of 1,157 observations. 
Our outcomes of interest are firm productivity which 
is measured in two different ways. First, it measures 
as multi-factor productivity or total factor produc-
tivity (TFP). To do so, we use a Cobb-Douglas 
production function with three input factors, that is, 
labor, capital, and material inputs. We assume that 
the function has constant returns to scale.  
 
We can express a log-linearized version of the 
production function for firm   and country   as 
follows: 
 
                                            (1) 
 
where     represents the output produced.    ,    , 
and     are the labor, physical capital, and material 
inputs.    ,    , and     are the output elasticity of 
each input and the sum of the three coefficient 
elasticities should be around one.     is the error 
term. TFP is defined as the residual of the above 
production function.  
 
We use gross annual sales and value added as the 
measures of output, wherein the latter is obtained by 
subtracting the total sales from the total cost of 
material and intermediate inputs. The measure of 
labor input is represented by the compensation of 
labor, including wages, salaries, bonuses, social 
security payments. We use the net book value of 
fixed assets after depreciation as the proxy for 
physical capital. The input of materials is calculated 
from the total cost of raw and intermediate goods.  
 
The second measure of our firm-level productivity is 
partial-factor productivity which consists of labor 
productivity and materials productivity. Labor 
productivity is measured as the ratio of firm sales to 
labor, whereas the productivity of materials is 
calculated as the ratio of firm sales to material 
inputs.  All variables in local currency are converted 
to U.S. dollars and then deflated with a U.S. GDP 
deflator by using data from the World Development 
Indicators database. We also transform our partial 
productivity measures into the logarithmic form 
because the two variables are heavily skewed to the 
right.1 
 
Indeed, the basic question in this current study is 
that: to what extent firm productivity differentials 
are explained by foreign presence in an industry. For 
this purpose, we simply model the participation of 
foreign firms in the manufacturing sector as a binary 
treatment variable. It takes a value of one for a firm 
with foreign owners and zero otherwise.  
                                                          
1 These results are available upon request. 
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We also control for firm characteristics, such as firm 
age (in logs), the number of permanent employees (in 
logs), the share of sales that is exported, and a series 
of dummy variables that are supposed to be 
significant determinants of productivity in the 
literature. The latter consists of firm size (20-99 
employees or medium and more than 99 employees 
or large), the educational attainment of production 
workers (secondary and university), the level of 
capacity utilization (if a firm operates with a 
minimum of 50% of its capacity), whether a firm 
imports material inputs, and the use of foreign-
licensed technology. 
 
Empirical Strategy: The Propensity Score 
Matching (PSM) 
 
We are interested in estimating the effect of foreign 
ownership on firm productivity. The idea is to 
compare the productivity of firm   in country   if this 
firm is foreign-owned (   
 ) and if the firm is not 
foreign-owned (   
 ). Thus, the causal effect of foreign 
ownership can be stated as: 
 
      
     
                                                             (2) 
 
The fundamental problem with equation (2) is that 
we are only able to observe one of these two potential 
outcomes. The missing outcome is well-known as a 
counterfactual outcome. The standard approach to 
solve this problem is to look at the average effect of 
foreign ownership (    ) instead of the individual 
effect.  
 
As mentioned earlier, we consider the status of firm 
ownership as a binary treatment with the treatment 
indicator     equals one if individual firm   in 
country   is foreign-owned and zero otherwise. We 
may define the average treatment effect of foreign 
ownership as follows (Caliendo and Kopeinig [18]):  
 
      ( |   )  
 , ( )|   -   , ( )|   -  (3) 
 
where the last term of the right-hand side of 
equation (3) is not directly observed, but we can  
substitute this part with the mean outcome of 
domestic firms,  , ( )|   -. Nevertheless, in a 
non-experimental study like us, this substitution 
method is more likely to lead to the so-called a self-
selection bias. Under this setting, the productivity of 
foreign and domestic firms would be different even 
without foreign ownership.  
 
The self-selection bias itself is identified on the left-
hand side of the following equation: 
 , ( )|   -   , ( )|   -       
 , ( )|   -   , ( )|   -                             (4) 
Thus, our challenge is to remove this bias 
Matching is one of promising techniques to control 
for the selection bias. The key identifying assump-
tion in the matching method is that outcomes are 
independent of treatment assignment conditional on 
a set of observable covariates   , or: 
 
    |      (5)  
 
The above condition refers to the conditional 
independence assumption (CIA) of Rosenbaum and 
Rubin [19]. Yet, this exact matching becomes 
problematic if there are many covariates, especially 
if they are continuous variables. In spite of this, as 
long as the CIA assumption continues to hold, we 
can use the propensity scores of   (the probability of 
being a foreign-owned firm conditional on observable 
characteristics of  ) rather than   themselves, when 
performing the matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 
[19]).  
 
Additionally, the propensity score matching (PSM) 
method requires substantial overlap in the 
distributions of the observed variables for foreign- 
and domestically-owned firms, where: 
 
    (   | )     (6) 
 
According to this common support condition, firms 
have positive probabilities of being both foreign and 
domestic firms if they have the same   scores.  
 
Finally, the average treatment effect of foreign 
ownership based on the PSM approach is calculated 
as the mean difference in outcomes over common 
support,  
 
    
       ( )|   * , ( )|      ( )-  
 , ( )|      ( )-+ (7) 
 
In fact, aside from the general form of the PSM 
method in equation (7), there are several types of 
matching algorithms which are different with regard 
to the definition of neighborhoods for each treated 
individual firm, the used approach to identify the 
common support region, and the weighting 
procedure for neighborhoods. Because no single PSM 
estimator can provide a satisfactory answer, we opt 
to perform four different matching algorithms 
aiming at checking the sensitivity of our results. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Before going into further analysis, we start by 
describing some basic characteristics of the used 
variables. It is subsequently followed by the 
discussion of our propensity score matching 
estimators which will be carried out into two stages. 
The first step is to construct a propensity score by 
running a logit model of foreign ownership based on 
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observable firm characteristics. We then use the 
obtained propensity score to estimate the missing 
counterfactual for each foreign-owned firm and 
calculate our causal effect of interest.  
 
Descriptive Analysis 
 
Table 1 reports the factor elasticities obtained for 
each country sample based on the two different 
measures of output, sales and value added, 
respectively. We can highlight three distinct aspects 
from these results.  First, as expected, the sum of    , 
   , and      is very close to one for each country. 
Second, while the contribution of material inputs to 
sales are the largest among the two other factors, 
labor inputs become the most important factor to the 
value-added output. Third, the manufacturing sector 
in those countries is considered to be the least capital 
intensive, where the share of capital is the lowest in 
the Philippines with a value of 0.0652, meaning that 
a 10% increase in capital is associated with a 0.65% 
increase in output (sales). 
 
Figure 1 displays the distributions of the 
productivity variables by country and ownership 
status. In general, it is suggested that the 
Philippines exhibits the largest heterogeneity, while 
the productivity of Indonesian firms is relatively 
homogenous. This implies that the number of firms 
with very high or very low productivity in the 
Philippines is higher than the number in the other 
two countries. However, it should be noted that this 
country also becomes the best performing country 
among Indonesia and Vietnam. Turning to the 
ownership status, foreign-owned firms in all 
countries under study show remarkably higher 
levels of productivity than domestically-owned firms, 
except for the measure of material productivity in 
Indonesia. 
 
Table 2 gives some summary statistics of the 
outcomes and the firm characteristics by ownership 
status. On average, firms with foreign shares 
experience higher productivity levels compared with 
domestic firms. It is also revealed a sizeable labor 
productivity premium of foreign firms. The labor 
productivity rate of foreign-owned firms is 0.45% 
higher than domestically-owned firms.   
 
Table 1. Estimated input elasticities 
              
Sales 
   Indonesia 0.2833 0.0807 0.6110 
Philippines 0.3334 0.0652 0.5758 
Vietnam 0.3767 0.1074 0.5088 
Value Added 
   Indonesia 0.4513 0.1029 0.3993 
Philippines 0.5634 0.0929 0.3031 
Vietnam 0.6567 0.1217 0.2061 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Distributions of the productivity variables 
 
The table also demonstrates that foreign firms are 
slightly older and have more permanent employees. 
When it comes to the firm size, a large number of 
domestically-owned firms fall under the medium 
category (35.49%), whereas the majority of foreign-
owned firms are large firms (63.91%). Moreover, the 
exercise confirms that the educational attainment of 
production workers in foreign firms is relatively 
higher than their domestic firm counterparts. In 
contrast to the usual picture of firms in developing 
countries, a large proportion of foreign and domestic 
firms in the sample do not underutilize their 
production capacity. Another striking difference 
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between the two groups comes from the rivalry 
among existing firms in which 63.63% domestically-
owned firms report that they face intense compe-
tition in the industry. Foreign firms largely engage 
in international trade activities with more than one 
third of these firms (39.19%) sell their product 
abroad and roughly 75.94% of them use imported 
material inputs. Likewise, foreign firms license 
foreign technology more than domestic firms (31.20% 
versus 10.63% respectively). 
 
Estimated Propensity Scores and the Quality 
of Matching 
 
The estimates of the probability of being foreign-
owned will help us to determine the covariates that 
should be included in the model. Table 3 presents 
the results from the estimated logit model. It is 
clearly shown that the coefficients of all variables are 
statistically significant with the exception of the 
number of employees, but more importantly, they 
have the expected signs. 
 
In particular, firms that are young, fall into the 
category of medium or large-sized, have workers 
with higher levels of educational attainment, more 
utilize their production capacity, confront with fewer 
competitors, export their products, import their 
material inputs, and license their foreign technology 
are more likely to be owned by foreigners. Our 
results suggest that we should take into conside-
ration these variables when specifying the propen-
sity score function.  
Table 2. Summary statistics by ownership status 
Variable Domestic Foreign 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Outcome     
TFP -0.0152 0.5506 0.1229 0.5671 
TFP-VA -0.0629 0.8268 0.1305 0.9476 
Labor productivity 1.9110 0.9916 2.3634 1.0316 
Material productivity 1.0757 0.7862 1.0807 0.8625 
Covariate     
Age  3.0421 0.4845 3.0037 0.4753 
Firm has between 20 and 99 emp. 0.3549 0.4787 0.2594 0.4391 
Firm has more than 99 emp. 0.2310 0.4217 0.6391 0.4812 
Number of emp.  3.5299 1.3680 4.9284 1.3745 
Avg. production worker with secondary education  0.3893 0.4878 0.6053 0.4897 
Avg. production worker with university education  0.0448 0.2069 0.0752 0.2642 
Capacity utilization 0.8297 0.3760 0.8985 0.3026 
Number of competitors 0.6363 0.4813 0.2895 0.4544 
Exporter 10.6531 27.1697 39.1880 43.7769 
Imported inputs 0.2318 0.4222 0.7594 0.4283 
Technology 0.1063 0.3084 0.3120 0.4642 
Number of observations 1251  266  
Grab your reader’s attention with a great quote from the document or use this space to emphasize a key point. To place this 
text box anywhere on the page, just drag it. 
 
Table 3. Logistic regression of ownership status on covariates  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error. z p-value 95% CI 
Constant -2.1378*** 0.6374 -3.3500 0.0010 -3.3871 -0.8884 
Age  -0.7878*** 0.1807 -4.3600 0.0000 -1.1420 -0.4335 
Firm has between 20 and 99 emp. 0.5836** 0.2706 2.1600 0.0310 0.0532 1.1140 
Firm has more than 99 emp. 0.8795*** 0.3437 2.5600 0.0100 0.2060 1.5531 
Number of emp.    0.1534 0.0973 1.5800 0.1150 -0.0373 0.3441 
Avg. production worker with 1.0171*** 0.1819 5.5900 0.0000 0.6606 1.3737 
secondary education 
      Avg. production worker with    0.9207 0.3532 2.6100 0.0090 0.2284 1.6129 
university education 
      Capacity utilization   0.5052* 0.2676 1.8900 0.0590 -0.0193 1.0297 
Number of competitors -0.8547*** 0.1960 -4.3600 0.0000 -1.2389 -0.4706 
Exporter 0.0083*** 0.0026 3.2200 0.0010 0.0032 0.0133 
Imported inputs 1.5771*** 0.1849 8.5300 0.0000 1.2147 1.9396 
Technology 0.6877*** 0.1939 3.5500 0.0000 0.3076 1.0678 
Number of observations = 1517, LL = -482.829, LR 𝜒2(11) = 442.910, Pseudo 𝑅2 = 0.314 
Notes:  *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level 
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Figure 2. Common Support Condition 
 
The estimated output shows that the mean of the 
estimated propensity scores function is 0.1753, and it 
displays high variability with the value of the 
standard deviation is 0.2156. We also plot the 
distribution of the scores of foreign-owned firms and 
the same distribution of the rest of the sample in the 
same graph to test whether the common support 
assumption is consistently fulfilled (Figure 2). The 
violation of this condition implies that there is high 
covariate heterogeneity among domestic firms. 
Consequently, the comparison of this group will be 
difficult. From the figure, we can clearly see that the 
region of common support between domestic and 
foreign firms is sufficiently high, ranging from 
0.0143 to 0.8447 (or about 84.47%). Finally, we are 
also able to satisfy the balancing property at the 0.01 
level with the final number of blocks is 6. 
 
For all covariates in the model, we also test if there 
are significant differences in means between foreign 
and domestic firms. Table 4 reprints the results of 
this exercise. Prior to matching (unmatched), the 
majority of t-statistics are statistically significant at 
either 1% or 5% levels with the exception of firm age. 
These findings indicate that the distribution of the 
used covariates is clearly unbalanced. However, by 
the matching procedure (matched), we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that the mean values of the two 
groups of firms do not differ for any variable. The 
corresponding t-values suggest that the matching is 
able to noticeably reduce the observable differences 
between foreign-owned firms and domestically-
owned firms. The method also reduces much of the 
bias attributable to these differences. In other words, 
the estimated propensity scores successfully balance 
our covariates in our matched sample. 
 
Estimated the Effects of Foreign Ownership 
 
The final step of our analysis is to estimate the 
average causal effect of foreign ownership on the 
measures of productivity.  In this paper, we use four 
different matching algorithms. In addition, we also 
compare the matching results with those from the 
OLS analysis. Apart from the dummy for foreign 
ownership, we regress our outcomes of interest on 
the same covariates used in the logistic regression 
above.  
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Table 4. Balance in covariates before and after matching: t-statistics for equality of means 
 
Variable 
Unmatched/ 
Matched 
t test 
%bias 
%reduced 
bias t p-value 
Age  Unmatched -1.1800 0.2390 -8.00 
 
 
Matched -0.4600 0.6430 -4.00 50.50 
Firm has between  Unmatched -3.0000** 0.0030 -20.80 
 20 and 99 emp. Matched -0.3600 0.7200 -3.00 85.60 
Firm has more than 99 emp. Unmatched 13.9700*** 0.0000 90.20 
 
 
Matched 0.2300 0.8160 2.20 97.60 
Number of emp.  Unmatched 15.1300*** 0.0000 102.00 
 
 
Matched 0.0600 0.9540 0.50 99.50 
Avg. production worker with  Unmatched 6.5500*** 0.0000 44.20  
secondary education Matched -0.8300 0.4100 -7.10 83.90 
Avg. production worker with  Unmatched 2.0700** 0.0390 12.80  
university  education Matched 1.0100 0.3110 9.10 29.00 
Capacity utilization Unmatched 2.8000*** 0.0050 20.10 
 
 
Matched 0.0900 0.9260 0.70 96.40 
Number of competitors Unmatched -10.7800*** 0.0000 -74.10 
 
 
Matched -0.2400 0.8120 -2.00 97.30 
Exporter Unmatched 13.7500*** 0.0000 78.30 
 
 
Matched 0.9500 0.3440 9.60 87.70 
Imported inputs Unmatched 18.4600*** 0.0000 124.10 
 
 
Matched 0.2900 0.7750 2.50 98.00 
Technology Unmatched 8.9400*** 0.0000 52.20 
 
 
Matched 0.2100 0.8300 2.20 95.80 
Number of observations     1251 266   
 Notes:  The matched sample is based on Caliper matching. *** Significant at the 1% level.  
 ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Referring to Table 5, we can generally underscore 
superior performance for foreign-owned firms, 
especially labor productivity. The obtained point 
estimates also suggest a downward bias of the OLS 
estimators. Among the four measures of firm 
productivity, we find that the estimates of the 
average treatment effect of foreign ownership on 
total factor productivity (sales) and labor produc-
tivity turn to be statistically and economically signi-
ficant, regardless our different analytical methods. 
On average, foreign firms have higher total factor 
productivity relative to domestic firms with the effect 
size is from approximately 10.36% (for local linear 
matching) to 16.15% (for nearest neighbor 
matching). The effect on labor productivity is even 
stronger. Again, the foreign presence increases the 
productivity of their workers from 23.70% (for local 
linear matching) to 35.57% (for nearest neighbor 
matching), whereas the OLS coefficient (21.90%) 
seems to somewhat underestimate the effect of 
foreign ownership. 
 
In contrast, the empirical findings indicate that the 
impact of foreign ownership on the two other 
productivity measures are not statistically distingui-
shable from zero. Yet, we shed light the relatively 
large effect of foreign ownership on the measure of 
total factor productivity based on value-added, 
ranging from 9.22% (for local linear matching) to 
18.94% (for nearest neighbor matching), but they are 
imprecisely estimated. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has provided new insights on the role of 
foreign ownership in the three ASEAN countries 
(Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam) on firm 
productivity. We are able to address the problem of 
selection bias that may potentially jeopardize the 
empirical results. Overall, our results demonstrate a 
positive impact of foreign ownership on firm 
productivity. Looking at the measure of multi-factor 
productivity, foreign-owned firms consistently 
exhibit higher levels of total factor productivity than 
domestically-owned firms. However, only the 
measure of total-factor productivity based on sales is 
statistically distinguishable from zero. Among the 
two measures of partial-factor productivity, a larger 
significant effect of foreign ownership is to be found 
in the productivity of labor. On the contrary, we 
reveal that the presence of foreign firms is 
statistically insignificant and has a marginal effect 
on the productivity of material inputs. These 
findings are robust to a number of different 
matching estimators. At last, given the availability of 
detailed data on the ownership status, we can extent 
this current work by allowing for a continuous 
treatment variable and assessing the impact of 
varying degrees of foreign ownership on firm 
performance. 
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